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ABSTRACT
River basin management and decentralisation reforms are promoted worldwide for
solving water pollution problems. In Mexico, governmental eﬀorts have been made
to operate wastewater treatment plants countrywide, but federal administrations
have not achieved their intended outcomes. Acknowledging the role of governance
in the implementation of wastewater treatment policy, this paper analyses three
cases in central Mexico and addresses the question: How does the governance
context aﬀect the implementation of the wastewater treatment policy in central
Mexico? A governance assessment tool is applied to answer the question. The
assessment allows an understanding of the governance context and is paired with
a comparative case study design. Data was collected through semi-structured
interviews and documents reviews. The results indicate that the governance
context mainly restricts the implementation of the wastewater treatment policy. In
all subnational three cases, the river basin management and decentralisation
reforms have not reached their objectives. By comparing the three cases, we found
that the state level can play a relevant role to decrease fragmentation and to
increase the coherence of the wastewater treatment policy. Therefore,
strengthening the involvement of the state government and the improvement of
mechanisms that limit political machinations can increase the supportiveness of the
governance context.
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Introduction
Wastewater treatment is failing around the world (UN WATER, 2014). Water pollution is among the most
challenging global problems due to its environmental and health implications. More than half of world’s hos-
pital beds are being used by people whose sickness is related to polluted water (Corcoran et al., 2010). It is esti-
mated that 80% of the wastewater is returned to the environment without a proper treatment (Connor,
Uhlenbrook, Koncagül, & Cordeiro Ortiagara, 2017). However, if wastewater is properly treated, it can bring
important economic, environment and health beneﬁts (Corcoran et al., 2010; WWAP & UNESCO, 2015).
Wastewater regulation and implementation are context dependent (Allaoui, Schmitz, Campbell, de la Porte,
& Programme, 2015). Therefore, it is necessary to ﬁnd context speciﬁc solutions instead of panaceas that
promise universal remedies (Ingram, 2008). Two of the highly promoted panaceas are decentralisation and
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river basin management, both of which are elements of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
(Gupta, Pahl-Wostl, & Zondervan, 2013). Mexico has adopted both river basin management and decentralisa-
tion. According to the National Water Commission (CONAGUA) ‘Mexico is fully committed to managing
water in an integrated manner, so as to optimize the demand from diﬀerent sources for the same water
resources’ (CONAGUA, 2012, p. 5). CONAGUA is the administrative, normative, technical and consultative
institution in charge of water management in Mexico. It is a decentralised agency of the Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources, working through 20 local oﬃces and 13 basin bodies, which are located
in the diﬀerent federal entities (CONAGUA, 2015b).
The attempts to implement river basin management and decentralisation of water management characterise
the national water context in Mexico. However, as previous research shows, despite the eﬀorts towards decen-
tralisation (Tortajada, 2004), this policy has failed (Casiano Flores, Özerol, & Bressers, 2017; Wilder, 2010;
Wilder & Romero, 2006), and has not brought the expected results (Herrera & Post, 2014). Decision-making
power is still centralised and within the hands of CONAGUA (Casiano Flores, Vikolainen, & Bressers, 2016;
OECD, 2013; Tortajada, 2004). CONAGUA steers the water policy and it is responsible for formulating the
National Water Plan according to the National Water Law (CONAGUA, 2014b). Consequently, river basin
organisations are seen as a mere decentralisation of oﬃces instead of a decentralisation of the policy (Jardines
Moreno, 2008). Throughout the reforms for river basin management and decentralisation, the implementation
of the wastewater treatment policy still faces important challenges. The objectives set by the last two federal
administrations have not been achieved (Casiano & Bressers, 2015) neither has the collaboration among the
governmental levels, non-governmental organisations and industry. These challenges were analysed 20 years
ago (Tortajada, 1998) and unfortunately, they are still present.
Despite this situation, Mexico has been successful in reaching the millennium development goals related to
water (SRE, 2015) by implementing diﬀerent water programmes. Water service delivery and sewage infrastruc-
ture have reached over 90% of the population (CONAGUA, 2015b). However, wastewater treatment is still
among the remaining challenges. In the last decade, the Mexican government has made important investments
in wastewater treatment plant construction and rehabilitation, with poor results though (Casiano & Boer de,
2015; Casiano & Bressers, 2015). Wastewater treatment is still around 50% and many treatment plants present
serious deﬁciencies.
None of the previous National Water Plans (NWP) have reached their objectives regarding wastewater treat-
ment. The NWP is the document that establishes the objectives, strategies and lines of action of the federal gov-
ernment during its time in oﬃce (CONAGUA, 2014a). The 2001–2006 NWP had the goal of achieving 65%
treatment of wastewater; however, it reached only 36.1%. The 2007–2012 NWP set a goal of 60% and achieved
47.5% (Casiano & Bressers, 2015). In 2014, there were 2337 wastewater treatment plants for municipal waste-
water and there were 2639 plants related with the industry sector (CONAGUA, 2015b). However, only very few
of these wastewater treatment plants are operating properly. The current 2014–2018 NWP has a goal of 63%
treated water (CONAGUA, 2014a) and in 2015 they reported that 55% had been achieved (CONAGUA,
2015a). In the case of industrial wastewater, the treatment rates are only 19.3% and as a result the government
has been accused of lacking in their enforcement for the wastewater treatment law (Greenpeace, 2014).
The situation provokes high pollution levels in surface water bodies, generating important health, social,
industrial and environmental issues. In Mexico there are still 9.1 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants caused by diar-
rheic diseases (CONAGUA, 2015b). ‘The quality of rivers, lakes and aquifers is at stake. Safe water and adequate
sanitation need to be provided to an additional 40 million inhabitants by 2030’ (OECD, 2013, p. 3).
Despite the relevance of wastewater treatment in Mexico, a lack of scientiﬁc evidence on this topic prevails.
Water policy analyses made so far usually focus on supply, demand and distribution, with a much lower interest
in sanitation and wastewater treatment (Pacheco-Vega, 2015b). Among the most relevant are the studies on the
Lerma-Chapala Basin (Pacheco-Vega, 2009) and Aguascalientes (Pacheco-Vega, 2015a). As Pacheco-Vega con-
cludes, a sub-national analysis is necessary with an in-depth examination of the institutional architecture of
wastewater policy (Pacheco-Vega, 2015b) in order to improve our understanding of the governance arrange-
ments. It is also necessary to understand the contextual factors and causal mechanisms regarding the
implementation of the sanitation policy (Pacheco-Vega, 2015b).
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In order to provide insights to these concerns, this paper acknowledges that collaboration is an important
aspect of water management and that context inﬂuences how collaboration processes takes place (de Boer,
Vinke-de Kruijf, Özerol, & Bressers, 2016). Therefore, we address the following question: How does the govern-
ance context aﬀect the implementation of the wastewater treatment policy in central Mexico? The implemen-
tation process regarding the wastewater treatment policy is examined under four stages, namely planning,
construction (including rehabilitation), operation, and monitoring.
Due to the comparative nature of this research, this paper also contributes to the debates on comparative
water governance, since few comparative studies have been undertaken in the Mexican context focusing on
the governance of wastewater treatment (Özerol et al., 2018). Through bridging this gap, the paper allows us
to 1) Contribute to systematic comparative studies in Mexico by comparing three subnational cases with diﬀer-
ent institutional arrangements and 2) Analyse the wastewater treatment policy from a governance perspective.
In this paper, we understand ‘water governance’ as a ‘water governance regime’. This implies that the perspec-
tive from which we observe water governance focuses on institutions and social structures, as it will be
explained in the following section.
Theoretical background
Collaborative approaches such as IWRM largely depend on process design and institutional conﬁguration
(Ananda & Proctor, 2013). Therefore, contextual factors must be considered when reformers push towards
an IWRM approach. In this regard, river basin management highlights the importance of collaborative manage-
ment across institutions in managing complex natural resources. However, the IWRM concept must be seen as
a means instead of an end; and reforms have to look for more pragmatic alternatives (Giordano & Shah, 2014).
In order to propose pragmatic answers, water governance assessments have recently called the attention of
academia and international organisations. Two recent compilations include respectively 13 and 25 water gov-
ernance assessment tools (Jacobson, Meyer, Oia, Reddy, & Tropp, 2013; OECD, 2015). Governance assessments
have become important because they can help both, identify implementation challenges and support rec-
ommendations. They also uncover the relationships between programmes, regulations and the achievement
of the established goals (Jacobson et al., 2013).
Many researchers have stressed the importance of the context when assessing water governance, and diﬀer-
ent frameworks have been developed (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Bressers & Kuks, 2013; Pahl-Wostl, 2009, 2015;
Pahl-Wostl, Holtz, Kastens, & Knieper, 2010; Thiel & Egerton, 2011; Van Rijswick, Edelenbos, Hellegers,
Kok, & Kuks, 2014). The framework we use to assess the governance context of each case is the Governance
Assessment Tool (GAT) (Bressers et al., 2015). GAT is applicable for multi-level settings with interdependency
among actors. These settings allow the GAT to analyse and compare a high number of cases worldwide. Until
now the GAT has been used mainly to analyse single cases such as: Palestine (Al-Khatib, Shoqier, Özerol, &
Majaj, 2017; Judeh, Haddad, & Özerol, 2017) Mexico (Casiano & Boer de, 2015; Casiano Flores et al., 2017,
2016) and England (Vikolainen, Flikweert, Bressers, & Lulofs, 2017). The only comparative analyses until
now, correspond to North-west Europe (Bressers, Bressers, & Larrue, 2016) and to an analysis on collaboration
in ﬁve cases (de Boer et al., 2016). However, none of these comparative analyses present a common operatio-
nalisation scale for both the comparison and the systematisation of the GAT.
The GAT is based on the Contextual Interaction Theory (CIT) (de Boer & Bressers, 2011; Bressers, 2009;
Bressers & Kuks, 2013; Bressers, Bressers, Kuks, & Larrue, 2016). The CIT is a third-generation implementation
theory that attempts to combine or to get the best of the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Third gen-
eration scholars have concentrated eﬀorts to understand better the policy implementation process (Lester &
Goggin, 1998).
The governance concept as used by the GAT has its roots in public policy and administration literature and
it is an attempt to organise the multiplicity of aspects mentioned in those literatures into a concise framework
(Bressers & Kuks, 2013). Governance is deﬁned as ‘the combination of the relevant multiplicity of responsibil-
ities and resources, instrumental strategies, goals, actor-networks and scales that forms a context that, to some
degree, restricts and, to some degree, enables actions and interactions’ (Bressers et al., 2013, p. 6). Water
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governance refers to the idea that water is managed through the interactions between public and private actors,
who operate at various levels, have diﬀerent perceptions and objectives, and employ various strategies and
instruments (Vinke-de Kruijf & Özerol, 2013, p. 2). Thus, governance is seen as ‘beyond merely government’
and as a ‘context’, within which the various actors of water management interact, and are inﬂuenced but not
determined by it (Bressers & Kuks, 2013).
The GAT comprises two elements, namely dimensions and criteria. The descriptive-analytical elements are
elaborated in ﬁve dimensions (multi-level, multi-actor, multi-faceted, multi-instrument and multi-resource
based), and the assessment is made for each dimension through applying four semi-normative1 criteria (coher-
ence, extent, ﬂexibility, and intensity). Answering the questions on each dimension provides a systematic
description of the governance context. This systematisation is a way of sorting through complexity that allows
a reasonable framework for practitioners to consider the context and dynamics of their particular settings
(O’Toole, 2004). The ﬁve dimensions can systematically describe a speciﬁc area concerning a speciﬁc issue,
such as wastewater treatment (Bressers et al., 2013). This governance regime concept emphasises that govern-
ance is seen as the context for action instead of the action itself (Bressers et al., 2013).
The four criteria of the GAT are deﬁned by the questions they pose (Bressers, Bressers, Kuks, et al., 2016):
. Extent: are all elements in the ﬁve dimensions, which are relevant for the sector or project being addressed,
taken into account?
. Coherence: are the elements in the dimensions of governance reinforcing, rather than contradicting, each
other?
. Flexibility: are multiple roads to the goals, depending on opportunities and threats as they arise, permitted
and supported?
. Intensity: how strongly do the elements in the dimensions of governance urge changes in the status quo or in
current developments?
The ﬁve dimensions and the four qualities provide a comprehensive understanding of how the different
elements of governance interact and inﬂuence the implementation setting. The assessment also provides expla-
nations about the degree to which the water governance regime can be supportive for the actors of policy
implementation (Bressers & Kuks, 2013). In other words, the assessment allows deeper understanding of the
governance context and how it impacts policy implementation. The GAT is made up of a ‘matrix’ consisting
of these ﬁve dimensions and four qualities (Bressers et al., 2015). Table 1 shows this matrix and the Method-
ology section will explain its operationalisation.
Methodology
The existence of a river basin commission and the decentralisation of the water policy are elements present in
the selected cases. According to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution, water services are the responsibility of
the municipalities and current management is derived from the National Water Law. The latest Water Law was
created in 1992 and underwent an important reform in 2004. This law is considered a major turning point
towards IWRM. It established a process of decentralisation of some key functions to municipalities, river
basin organisations and irrigation districts. It was supported through important investments to improve waste-
water treatment plants (OECD, 2013). Under this law, the Basin Commissions were created to address particu-
lar water issues at the sub-basin level. These bodies work as mechanisms for stakeholder participation.
CONAGUA has 26 river basin councils that work with 35 river basin commissions, 47 river basin committees,
87 COTAS (Technical groundwater committees) and 39 local clean beach committees (CONAGUA, 2015b).
The process of decentralisation in Mexico started in the 1980s with the delegation of water services to the
municipal level (Rodríguez Briceño, 2008). In 1983, reforms established water services as an exclusive function
of the municipalities and the state government as transitional entities. In most of the cases the state government
transferred the new obligation to the municipalities immediately (Jardines Moreno, 2008). However, the Mex-
ican Constitution also states that municipalities can collaborate with other municipalities or the state
4 C. CASIANO FLORES ET AL.
government to provide the water services (IMCO, 2014). The policy of delegating water services to utilities at
the municipal level has been criticised during the last years. The municipality, even when it is the closest to the
public, has a short-term government of three years (Rodríguez Briceño, 2008) and lacks both ﬁnancial and tech-
nical resources for water policy implementation (IMCO, 2014; Pacheco-Vega, 2015a; Pineda, 2002; Pineda &
Salazar, 2008).
The three selected cases are located in central Mexico and they belong to the Valle de Mexico and Balsas
basins. The case of Lago de Guadalupe-Estado de Mexico is located in the Valle de Mexico basin and the
cases of Atoyac-Puebla and Zahuapan-Tlaxcala belong to the Balsas basin. The two basins have the biggest chal-
lenges in water quality and wastewater treatment infrastructure (CONAGUA, 2011).
The Atoyac River belongs to the Balsas basin, it is the third most polluted river in Mexico and crosses the
states of Puebla and Tlaxcala (Lira, 2016). The pollution of this river aﬀects 2,300,000 inhabitants in the state of
Puebla (Ochoa & Arroyo, 2016). The basin is formed by the Atoyac and Zahuapan rivers and has the highest
mortality index for less than 5-year-old children. The mortality is caused by gastrointestinal diseases due to the
river pollution (Gómez, 2016). In the case of the Presa Guadalupe, the pollution has mainly created an environ-
mental problem. Massive death of birds and ﬁsh in the main lake of the basin have been reported at diﬀerent
occasions (Chávez, 2005; Chávez & Martínez, 2008; Cruz, 2017). Although the state government granted the
status of natural protected area in 2004, the lake is highly polluted and the water is not suitable for human con-
sumption or recreation and it is considered one of the most polluted lakes in the country (Ríos, 2017).
Table 1. Water governance assessment matrix.
Qualities of the governance regime
Governance Dimension Extent Coherence Flexibility Intensity
Levels & Scales How many levels are
involved and dealing
with an issue? Are
there any important
gaps or missing levels?
Do these levels work
together and do they trust
each other between levels?
To what degree is the
mutual dependence
recognised?
Is it possible to move up
and down levels
(upscaling and
downscaling) given the
issue at stake?
Is there a strong impact
from a certain level
towards behavioural
change or
management reform?
Actors & Networks Are all relevant
stakeholders involved?
Who are excluded?
What is the strength of
interactions between
stakeholders? In what way
are these interactions
institutionalised in stable
structures? Do the
stakeholders have
experience in working
together? Do they trust
and respect each other?
Is it possible that new actors
are included or even that
lead shifts from one actor
to another when there are
pragmatic reasons for
this? Do the actors share
in social capital allowing
them to support each
other’s task?
Is there a strong impact
from an actor or actor
coalition towards
behavioural change or
management reform?
Problem Perspectives &
Goal Ambitions
To what extent are the
various problem
perspectives taken
into account?
To what extent do the
various goals support each
other, or are they in
competition or conﬂict?
Are there opportunities to
re-assess goals?
How diﬀerent are the
goal ambitions from
the status quo?
Strategies & Instruments What types of
instruments are
included in the policy
strategy and are
implemented and
which are excluded?
To what extent is the
resulting incentive system
based on synergy? Are
there any overlaps or
conﬂicts of incentives
created by the included
policy instruments?
Are there opportunities to
combine or make use of
diﬀerent types of
instrument? Is there a
choice?
What is the implied
behavioural deviation
from current practice
and how strongly do
the instruments
require and enforce
this?
Responsibilities &
Resources
Are responsibilities
clearly assigned and
suﬃciently facilitated
with resources?
To what extent do the
assigned responsibilities
create competence
struggles or cooperation
within or across
institutions?
To what extent is it possible
to pool the assigned
responsibilities and
resources as long as
accountability and
transparency are not
compromised?
Is the amount of
allocated resources
suﬃcient to implement
the measures needed
for the intended
change?
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The three cases are also part of the most populated metropolitan area, the central Mexico megalopolis.
Figure 1 shows the location of the cases.
The three cases were selected because they present diﬀerences in their institutional arrangements to address
the wastewater treatment policy, while sharing a common goal with diﬀerent outcomes. In the case of Puebla,
the diﬀerent governmental levels participate through the implementation of the CONAGUA programmes.
While the federal and state governments build the wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), the municipalities
are entitled to operate them. In the case of Tlaxcala, the implementation is also through CONAGUA’s pro-
grammes, however, the state government has started a regionalisation policy of the WWTPs. They operate
some plants directly and charge the municipalities for this service. For this purpose, reforms took place at
the state level. In the Presa Guadalupe case, the policy is also implemented through CONAGUA’s programmes
and a River Basin Commission with social participation was created to support the implementation process.
Figure 2, shows the institutional conﬁguration of the cases.
A case study approach was adopted, since it is relevant for studies, in which context can make a diﬀerence
(Kaarbo & Beasley, 1999, p. 388). It also follows a comparative design that analyses and synthesises the simi-
larities, diﬀerences and patterns across multiple cases that share a common focus or goal (Goodrick, 2014).
We consider that the diversity of the institutional arrangement represents the most common institutional scen-
arios nationwide. However, we are aware that the geographical region can pose certain limitations regarding the
conclusions of our study (Geddes, 1990). The way the cases are compared is by showing the similarities and
diﬀerences across them. Regional variations are analysed under the common national context of central Mexico.
Table A in the supplementary material presents the operationalisation of the elements of the GAT to assess the
three cases. Until now, this table has only being applied for Presa Guadalupe case (Casiano Flores et al., 2017,
p. 33). This is the ﬁrst time that is being applied for the other two cases for comparative purposes. This sup-
plementary table helps us to present in a transparent manner the elements considered to assess each case.
To assess each cell, each response is analysed individually, then compared and/or complemented with the
rest of the stakeholders’ answers and data from secondary sources. The degree of the quality in each dimension
is compared with the rest to ﬁnd a general assessment per quality. The quality per cell can be ranked as high,
moderate or low. The matrix was used to assess the three single cases and to allow comparison among them.
The ﬁnal result can be: High support, Moderate support, Moderate-low support and Low support.
Figure 1. Location of the cases.
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When the general assessment is from moderate to high, the quality is considered supportive, otherwise is
restrictive. High means that most of the categories of the quality where from moderate to high. Moderate is
when most of the categories are from moderate-low to high. Moderate-low is when most of the categories
are assessed from moderate-low to low and it is low when there is an overwhelming majority of low degree
in each category of the quality.
The qualities are assessed mainly based on the interviewees’ answers. A total of 66 semi-structured inter-
views were conducted between July 2013 and March 2016. The case of Puebla involved 23 interviews (2013–
2015). In the case of Tlaxcala, 21 interviews took place (2014–2015), and Presa Guadalupe involved 20 inter-
views and two questionnaires via email (2015–2016). Table 2 shows the aﬃliations of the interviewees. This
primary research is supported with oﬃcial documents and reports from governmental institutions as well as
international organisations. Electronic newspapers were also reviewed.
Description of the cases
Tlaxcala
The Atoyac-Zahuapan sub-basin hosts 79.5% of the Tlaxcala state inhabitants (Rodríguez, 2010). The interest
for wastewater treatment in Tlaxcala started in 1985. Then the state government created The Company for
Figure 2. Institutional conﬁguration of the three selected cases at the sub-basin level.
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Control of Polluted Water in the State of Tlaxcala and The State Drinking Water and Sewage Commission
(Rodríguez, 2010). In 2009, the new State Water Law established two governmental bodies, the Water State
Commission (CEAT), which is considered the organisation for water related matters with technical, normative
and consultation capacity and the Centre for Integral Water Treatment (CSITARET). The CSITARET is in
charge of the wastewater treatment policy. It operates some WWTPs and monitors the quality of water dis-
charges. In 2011, only 2 out of 128 WWTPs were operating but in May 2014, the state government announced
that 61 WWTPs were working, representing 61.08% of the treatment capacity (Casiano Flores et al., 2016, p. 6).
Legislative reforms were made to improve the government’s capacity in wastewater policy implementation.
Since 2011, a wastewater treatment regionalisation process is ongoing, and currently the state government oper-
ates nine WWTPs and monitors 60 (Casiano Flores et al., 2016).
Puebla
Puebla’s Alto Atoyac sub-basin is part of the Balsas River Basin. In 2010, Puebla’s Alto Atoyac sub-basin had 22
WWTP located in 7 municipalities (CEAS & SSAOT, 2012). The wastewater treatment policy started in 1997
when the ﬁrst River Declaration was created. This legal document established the parameters that must be con-
sidered for wastewater discharges permits. It was expected that the river could protect aquatic life in 2015. How-
ever, the Atoyac river went from being the seventh to the third most polluted river in Mexico (Castillo, 2013).
The three levels of the government and the society do not perceive any improvement in the water quality and
wastewater treatment capacity was reported as 10%, instead of the 35% stated by the previous federal admin-
istration (Casiano & Bressers, 2015). The last relevant action from the state government was in 2014 when the
main water utility was privatised. Currently, the four WWTPs are not working properly (Méndez, 2016). The
suspended solids are 240% higher than the River Declaration parameters while Biochemical Oxygen Demand
(BOD) is over 1010% (Dale la cara al Atoyac, 2016) and only from 1% to 2% of the industry sector and muni-
cipalities meet the discharge quality norm (Camacho Fierro, 2016).
Presa Guadalupe
The Presa Guadalupe sub-basin is formed by ﬁve municipalities in the Estado deMexico. In 2006 after a massive
ﬁsh death in 2004, the Presa Guadalupe River Basin Commission was created in a bottom-up process to improve
water quality in the sub-basin (Franco-Garcia, Hendrawati-Tan, Gutierrez-Diaz, Casiano, & Bressers, 2013). An
Table 2. Aﬃliations of the interviewees.
Puebla Tlaxcala Presa Guadalupe
Federal CONAGUA Balsas Organisation, CONAGUA
Delegation, PROFEPA (Environmental
Attorney)
CONAGUA Balsas Organisation, CONAGUA
Delegation
CONAGUA Delegation, Presa de
Guadalupe Commission
State CEAS (Water State Commission), Ministry of
Infrastructure, MIRA (Module of Information
about the Atoyac River), Ministry of Finance
Coordinacion General de Ecologia (General
Coordination of Ecology), SECODUVIT
(Ministry of Infrastructure), CSITARET (Centre
for Integral Water Treatment), CEAT (State
Water Commission)
CAEM (Water State Commission),
Ministry of the Environment,
Ministry of Agriculture
Water
utility
SOAPAP (Water System Operator for Drinking
Water and Sewage of Puebla)
SOSAPACH (Water System Operator Cholula),
SOSAPAHUE (Water System Operator
Huejotzingo),
SOSAPATEX (Water System Operator
Texmelucan)
CAEM Tlaxcala (Water Utility of Tlaxcala),
CAEM Chiautempan,
CAEM Huamantla,
CAEM Apizaco,
CAEM Tlaxco
SAPASA (Water Utility of
Atipazan),
OPERAGUA (Water Utility of
Cuautitlan Izcalli),
Isidro Fabela
Representative in the Presa de
Guadalupe Commission
Industry CCE (Business Council Coordinator) Textile Industry Aquaculture
Civil
society
Los Atoyaqueros, Water activists Colegio de Tlaxcala, Fray
Julian Garcés NGO,
PRONATURA NGO
Comité de Rescate del Lago de
Guadalupe, Water activists
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important collaborative eﬀort took place in 2006, when the Commission members with CONAGUA and the
Mexican Institute of Water Technology (IMTA) created a strategic plan. This plan contained speciﬁc goals to
address the basin problems, including water pollution (Franco-Garcia et al., 2013). Ten years after the creation
of the plan and the basin Commission, stakeholders agree that pollution problems still remain (Casiano Flores
et al., 2017). Until 2013, the municipalities that form the sub-basin had 18 WWTPs (CONAGUA & SEMAR-
NAT, 2013). The interviewees mentioned that the WWTPs do not operate properly, if not at all.
Results of the assessments and their comparative analysis
Table 3 presents the result of the three assessments. These results are somewhat diﬀerent from the previous
studies of Puebla (Casiano & Boer de, 2015) and Tlaxcala (Casiano Flores et al., 2016). The reasons are that
they were the ﬁrst analysed cases and therefore the contextual knowledge was more limited. For example,
the case of Puebla did not include the monitoring stage of the wastewater treatment policy. While in the
case of Tlaxcala, the policy of regionalisation was also a new element that was not analysed previously. Com-
paring the three diﬀerent cases allows a standardisation and reﬁnement of the assessment; and permits a larger
temporal scope of analysis. A detailed explanation of the individual assessments can be found in the supplemen-
tary materials of this article.
Based on the individual assessments presented in Table 3, we ﬁrst address the restrictive characteristics of the
governance context and then the supportive ones. In this way, the restrictive and supportive eﬀects of the gov-
ernance regime on the implementation process are shown in a systematic manner.
The restrictive characteristics of the governance context
Extent is ranked as moderate-low in both Tlaxcala and Estado de Mexico and low in Puebla. In the multi-level
scheme, the three cases share two characteristics. The federal government is the main driver of the policy, sup-
ported by the state government, and the municipal level is the least involved level, who has insuﬃcient resources
and capacity to enforce the policy. Societal actors are excluded from the policy implementation and this is
reﬂected in the perspectives considered. Some governmental actors emphasise that societal participation brings
complexity and problems to the implementation. In all cases, NGOs are setting the topic on the governmental
agenda. However, they do not impact the policy in any phase. The way these non-governmental actors call the
attention from the government varies across cases. Tlaxcala is the extreme case, where the NGO has made legal
allegations against the government.
In the three cases, the institution where the state and federal government take decisions about policy
implementation is the Commission of Regulation and Follow up (CORESE). The CORESE is created by the
Rules of Operation of CONAGUA’s programmes. It allows the state government to present proposals to the
programmes of the federal government (CONAGUA, 2013). The investments through these programmes
require co-investments from the state and the municipal level, and the state level plays an important role in
the planning phase and the tender. Thus, the role of the state government has increased as part of this decen-
tralisation process. This situation is present in diﬀerent degrees in the three cases. A lack of secondary law of the
National Water Law weakens its implementation. However, several mandatory norms are in place. In Puebla
and Tlaxcala, they share the River Classiﬁcation, a legal document enacted by the federal government, where the
parameters for wastewater discharges were made stricter, and they must be considered when granting new dis-
charge permits.
Responsibilities are clearly assigned in all cases. However, only few are facilitated with resources. The federal
government does not perceive any improvement in the outcomes of the water utilities since the decentralisation
process started in the 1980s (CONAGUA, 2015c). Planning, operation and monitoring responsibilities lack
most of the resources. The main amount of economic resources is placed on the construction or rehabilitation
of the plants. In the three cases, the WWTPs present operational problems or they are abandoned.
Coherence was assessed as moderate to low in Tlaxcala and Guadalupe. However, in the three cases the gov-
ernmental actors acknowledge dependency among the three levels. Lack of trust also exists, particularly in the
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Table 3. Individual results from the governance assessments.
Alto Atoyac Puebla Atoyac-Zahuapan Tlaxcala Presa Guadalupe, Estado de México
Qualities Qualities Qualities
Governance Dimension Extent Coherence Flexibility Intensity Extent Coherence Flexibility Intensity Extent Coherence Flexibility Intensity
Levels & Scales Low Low Low Moderate-
Low
Moderate Moderate Moderate-
Low
Moderate Moderate Moderate-
Low
Low Moderate-
Low
Actors & Networks Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Moderate Moderate-
Low
Moderate-
Low
Low Low
Problem Perspectives &
Goal Ambitions
Low Low Low Low Low Moderate Low Low Low Moderate-
Low
Low Low
Strategies & Instruments Moderate-
Low
Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate Low Moderate-
Low
Moderate-
Low
Moderate-
Low
Low Low
Responsibilities &
Resources
Low Moderate-Low Low Low Moderate-
Low
Moderate Moderate-
Low
Moderate-
Low
Low Moderate Low Low
Contextual eﬀect: Low:
Restrictive
Moderate-Low:
Restrictive
Low:
Restrictive
Low:
Restrictive
Moderate-
Low:
Restrictive
Moderate:
Supportive
Moderate-
Low:
Restrictive
Moderate:
Supportive
Moderate-
Low:
Restrictive
Moderate-
Low:
Restricitve
Low:
Restrictive
Low:
Restrictive
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cases of Presa Guadalupe and Puebla. The interactions of the governmental actors are institutionalised due to
the CORESE. The Presa Guadalupe case is the only one that adds another institution. The governance context is
not supportive of the river basin commissions. In the Tlaxcala case, the commission never had a session and in
the Presa Guadalupe does not impact the policy. The CORESE and the Presa Guadalupe Commission insti-
tutions confront important challenges every three and six years, when due to elections, changes in the govern-
mental conﬁguration take place. According to the state and federal actors interviewed, the main challenge
comes at the municipal level, where the election period is every three years.
Interviewees agree that the institutional arrangement was set to create cooperation. However, instability due
to elections, fragmentation and political factors aﬀect this cooperation setting. One of the main challenges is the
budget assignment for projects. There is a lack of coherence between the Ministry of Finance and the CONA-
GUA for project funding. The CONAGUA has to prove that the projects have legal, environmental, social and
economic feasibility. After this approval, the Ministry of Finance selects the projects. CONAGUA and the Min-
istry of Finance evaluate programmes on diﬀerent parameters. In case of a problem that requires two infrastruc-
ture projects to work together, the possibilities of only one getting the funds are high. As a result, governors
sometimes lobby for very speciﬁc projects, and the promises from the president are the main priority for the
Ministry of Finance.
Flexibility is low in the three cases. This issue can be explained by the hierarchical system and the lack of
trust. The inﬂuence of the hierarchy begins at the planning stage. Each governmental level has to adjust their
planning to the next upper level. Therefore, the hierarchical and legal structure favours that the leadership be
expected from the federal government, and the state and municipal levels must adapt their plans to the national
goals. This situation limits their scope of actions as they respond to upper levels instead of their necessities. Due
to lacking resources and capacity leadership is expected from the upper levels who commonly have more
resources. This setting provokes that the river basin planning is not connected with the formal planning struc-
ture, making the integrated planning a mere superﬁcial element. The national and state laws allow creating
agreements between diﬀerent governmental levels or among them, enabling a certain degree of ﬂexibility.
New actors are not allowed in the CORESE, and since the policy is implemented through CONAGUA’s pro-
grammes, the Rules of Operation is the legal element that deﬁnes which actors can participate. Until 2015 the
participation was limited to the state and the federal government. However, since 2016 the participation
includes the municipal level too. Governmental and non-governmental actors work separately. The govern-
mental levels only support each other limiting themselves to what is mandated by law.
Lack of assessment is also a regular occurrence at the three governmental levels. This impacts the policy
negatively, since assessments are vital for lesson learning (Matland, 1995). A realistic assessment comes
when governmental changes take place and the new authorities aim to show how the last administration failed
in their intended goals. However, this is a political strategy. Lack of ﬂexibility also aﬀects planning. For WWTP
construction or rehabilitation, the state government has one year to plan and execute any associated actions,
thus low-quality planning and poor execution is common. Multi-annual projects require high levels of planning
since changes in the prices are not allowed and the Ministry of Finance rejects on average 90% of the proposals.
The Ministry of Finance does not easily approve multi-annual planning because that part of the budget cannot
be taken into account anymore in case of budget cuts or if there is the necessity to make changes in the budget
through the year. Therefore, actors at lower governmental levels prefer to limit themselves to annual planning
and multi-annual projects are not commonly submitted. Short oﬃce terms and lack of knowledge limits their
interest to seek actions outside the managerial establishment.
The resources are pooled together under CONAGUA, who is the biggest spender in the water sector. How-
ever important problems were mentioned about accountability, and this element is a condition for increasing
regulatory eﬀectiveness (May, 2007). For the construction of WWTPs, the federal government commonly pro-
vides around 50% of the cost and the state and municipal level 25% each. The actor in charge of the tender is the
state government. In this sense, it is the state level under the authorisation of CONAGUA that decides how the
construction budget will be spent. Complaints about mismanagement and over-pricing were mentioned by the
federal and municipal level as well as non-governmental actors against the state level behaviour.
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Intensity is low in Puebla and Presa Guadalupe. However, the three cases share similarities about the
coalition of actors favouring the implementation. The network that is impacting the policy is formed by the
state and federal government. Also in all three cases, this network has not been capable of achieving the
goals presented in the diﬀerent plans. For Puebla and Presa Guadalupe, the actors do not perceive improve-
ments in the water quality and they do not notice changes in this regard. Therefore, important modiﬁcations
are required to improve enforcement. For example, only a few municipalities have discharge permits, and this
creates an economic burden for the water utilities since a lack of this permit creates sanctions from CONAGUA.
This limits their already scarce resources.
In all three cases, particularly for Puebla and Presa Guadalupe, concerns were raised about the tender process
for the construction of the WWTPs. For all the cases, at least one interviewee argued that CONAGUA over-
looks municipalities and had uneven enforcement towards the industry sector. However, interviewees from
CONAGUA argue that it is very diﬃcult to sanction municipalities since they cannot close down their waste-
water discharges, because if they do it would create a social problem. In this regard, law enforcement is a com-
mon complaint from NGOs against municipalities and the industrial sector.
The amount of resources for all the implementation phases is limited. In the three cases, municipalities are
facing main challenges. On average, the water utilities in Mexico obtain 75% of the economic resources they
need to operate (IMCO, 2014). The main funding should come from the municipalities through the water
tariﬀs they charge. There is a norm to evaluate and establish the water tariﬀ (CONAGUA, 2015b). However,
the ﬁnal tariﬀ is established based on the negotiations in the Congress, where politicians are concerned
about their political career. CONAGUA and the State Water Commissions also lack personnel. The most dra-
matic case is Presa Guadalupe, where only one person is in charge of reviewing the WWTP projects for all the
Estado de Mexico, which has a population of more than 15 million people (INEGI, 2015). When the CONA-
GUA was created in 1989, it had 38,188 employees, and in December 2014 the number has been reduced to
13,661 (CONAGUA, 2015b).
Monitoring at the municipal level is also uncommon, and water utilities lack resources to fulﬁl all their
responsibilities related to the policy; they require the support from upper levels. Construction and rehabilitation
of plants is another important issue for Puebla and Presa Guadalupe. Majority of the water utilities argue that
their plants are in bad condition and they require important investments. There is a low capacity from the fed-
eral government to verify the planning and to audit the resources. CONAGUA has a limited capacity to docu-
ment how states manage their resources as well as irregularities in the use of federal funds (OECD, 2013). It
seems that CONAGUA is ﬁnancing more projects than the ones they can properly monitor. This makes
accountability an important issue that needs to be addressed.
The supportive characteristics of the governance context
Extent is not very supportive in all three cases. However, Tlaxcala and Presa Guadalupe deserve special atten-
tion as some of the dimensions were assessed as moderate. In the case of Tlaxcala, extent was moderate for the
levels and scales dimension. This is due to the regionalisation policy and the programmes between the state and
the municipal level. In this particular case, the state government is responsible for the planning, operation, con-
struction and monitoring of the WWTPs. The municipalities pay a fee for the treatment, and this way the state
government secures resources for the operation and the municipalities are not concerned about their technical
capacity for the operation or the rehabilitation of the plant. The other moderate aspect comes from the active
role the state government has had through the reforms that allow them to increase resources and to bring stabil-
isation to the implementation process. In the Presa Guadalupe case, the involvement of the state level indicates
moderate supportiveness for the levels and scales dimension. However, the role of the state has been more lim-
ited as compared to Tlaxcala. The state government has not been able to charge the municipalities for the oper-
ation of the WWTPs and the regionalisation policy has not been implemented in this sub-basin.
Coherence was assessed as moderate in the case of Tlaxcala. Before 2016, the CORESE involved only the
state and the federal government. The limitation to these two actors and therefore the increasing coherence
for the implementation policy phases has also increased trust, mainly among the state and federal government.
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The longer stability of these two governmental levels has also supported the implementation. The relationship is
also favoured by a more balanced power status. Fewer number of actors also means less complexity and this can
favour the alignment of perspectives and goals. It seems that in this context, this situation helps the reaching of
agreements and actions that can improve the policy implementation. When the municipalities were in charge of
the operation their perspective was not considered, and therefore operational problems were present. Civil ser-
vants from the Tlaxcala’s Water State Commission succeeded in bringing operation concerns to the table at the
Ministry of Infrastructure to keep the price of treatment as low as possible. This is diﬀerent form the usual
experience of the water utilities, who argue that they are not heard by the state government. Currently, the
role of each actor seems more speciﬁc and synergy among the federal and state government is easier to develop.
The involvement of only two upper levels allowed in this case a high degree of cooperation among them and this
facilitated the implementation.
Flexibility has the most supportive role in the case of Tlaxcala. However, it was still moderate-low. A sup-
portive aspect is present since the government took a step forward by creating agreements with the municipa-
lities to take the responsibility of operating the WWTPs and this has improved the implementation. Resources
are being pooled favouring the implementation. For example, some plants receive wastewater from diﬀerent
municipalities so costs are shared among them. There are six inter-municipal plants that provide service to
14 municipalities and three of them to industrial corridors. The resources for the operation of these plants
come from the subsidy of the state government, municipal fees, industrial fees and incentives from the federal
government. Nevertheless, dependency on the upper level is maintained by the institutional arrangement and
CONAGUA’s programmes reinforce the status quo.
Intensity was also assessed as moderate in the case of Tlaxcala. One of the main reasons is the policy of
regionalisation which has been strengthened by the reforms at the state level. In the Tlaxcala case, the intervie-
wees perceive more interest from the state government and they emphasised that the impact on policy
implementation comes from the coalition of the state and the federal government. The published state reforms
of the State Financial Code (2009) and changes to the Federal Fund for Strengthening the Municipalities (2014)
have favoured intensity (Casiano Flores et al., 2016). The changes to the Federal Fund and the State Financial
Code provide the state government with economic resources from the municipalities for operating theWWTPs.
The state government has made signiﬁcant investments to increase monitoring of the discharges for the muni-
cipalities and the industry sector. Despite these eﬀorts, the goals established by the River Classiﬁcation are still
far from the current situation.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper presented a systematic and comparative governance assessment of the wastewater treatment policy
in central Mexico. To do so we addressed the question: How does the governance context aﬀect the implemen-
tation of the wastewater treatment policy in central Mexico? To compare the three cases, we standardised the
application of the GAT for the wastewater treatment policy. With this comparison, we have addressed the
lack of sub-national analysis with an in-depth examination of the institutional architecture of wastewater policy
and the understanding of the contextual factors that aﬀect the sanitation policy.
Table A of the supplementary material shows the operationalisation of the GAT, which has been tailored to
the three most common institutional scenarios for WWTP policy implementation in Mexico. Therefore, it can
later also be employed to assess other cases. The results show that the governance context is not supportive of
implementing the wastewater treatment policy. The policy implementation still lacks a basin vision and a long-
term perspective. The involvement of stakeholders is also limited. None of the Basin Commissions create the
expected impact. The Tlaxcala Commission never had a session and the Guadalupe Commission does not
impact the policy implementation. The implementation relies on political factors, and economic resources
are dependent on the inter-ministerial negotiations between CONAGUA, the Ministry of Finance and political
interests.
We found that decentralisation and river basin management policies, combined with the hierarchical system,
result in the federal and municipal government providing a similar context in the three cases, despite their
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institutional conﬁguration. As it was diagnosed 10 years ago, IWRM still remains an elusive goal (Scott & Ban-
ister, 2008). The federal level is still the main driver of the policy, and the least capable actor is the municipal
level. In this sense, our comparative assessment revealed that the state level can play a determinant role in
implementing the wastewater treatment policy. The current context mainly supports symbolic participation
(Casiano Flores et al., 2017) and symbolic implementation of the policy (Casiano & Boer de, 2015).
Accountability of governmental actors needs to be addressed. Tlaxcala is the only state where the website of
the Water State Commission presents detailed information about the investments and monitoring of the
WWTPs. We found that in the three cases, the NGOs have been pushing the topic into the agenda, promoting
awareness and acting as watchdogs. The industry sector demands even implementation and support from the
government. They question whether or not the government wants to enforce the law on them while many gov-
ernmental entities do not meet the discharge parameters.
The lack of stability and capacity at the municipal level creates challenges for the policy implementation, and
these conditions should be considered when decentralisation and basin management are to be enforced. The
three cases prove that there is lack of interest from governmental actors to collaborate with social groups.
The most dramatic case being the Presa Guadalupe Commission, which exempliﬁes that implementation of
participatory mechanisms do not necessarily improve the management and governance of water resources
in the long term (Vinke-de Kruijf & Özerol, 2013). This argument regarding the complexity of social partici-
pation in young democracies, is strengthen by a recent study in Mexico, which found that when institutions at
the local or municipal level are successful with social participation, politicians will try to regain control over
such institutions; since they become both a social and a political capital for politicians’ careers (Herrera, 2017).
The concerns regarding the lack of monitoring capacity as well as vertical and horizontal coordination are
not new; they were pointed out 20 years ago (Tortajada, 1998). The fact that these concerns are still present,
show that the reforms did not have the expected results. A more pragmatic alternative, based on our ﬁndings
might be the promotion of a more active role of the state government. Under the current context in central
Mexico, the decentralisation of the policy strengthens the importance and the role of the state government.
Concentrating on the collaboration between the state and federal government as well as strengthening the
role of state government seems to be an adequate response. There is a positive correlation between the degree
of restrictiveness placed on the policy implementation process and the role of the state level. The most restric-
tive context is, where the participation of the state government is the most limited. Strengthening the role of the
state government and the improvement of mechanisms that limit the impact of political machinations can be
instrumental to increase the supportiveness of the governance context.
There is ample evidence provided by our comparison of subnational cases that in the context of the rest of
water governance conditions in central Mexico, the state level is the single most inﬂuential factor. However, it is
important to emphasise that the state level involvement is diﬀerent in each case. Acknowledging the geographi-
cal limitation of this research, additional evidence from other regions of the country can strengthen the con-
clusions derived from the three cases examined in this paper. Recent ﬁndings show that among the best
performing water utilities for WWTP policy are those that operate at the state level. Such as Nuevo Leon (Agui-
lar-Barajas, Sisto, & Ramírez Orozco, 2015; Herrera, 2014) and Aguascalientes (Pacheco-Vega, 2015a) both in
the north of Mexico. While in Nuevo León, the water utility works at the state level. In the cases of Aguasca-
lientes and Tlaxcala, the operation and construction of wastewater treatment plants is now a responsibility of
the state level, although they are not in charge of all the water-related services. The role of the state government
seems relevant in the Mexican context. However, its participation and collaboration needs to be tailored to the
contextual circumstances.
The state government’s participation faces two challenges. In all the three cases, the involvement of this gov-
ernmental level is not mandatory. According to the law, main responsibilities for policy implementation are at
the municipal and national level. Therefore, lack of legal responsibilities decreases the chances of enforcement,
making the interest of the state government a prerequisite.
One of the main challenges that the state participation faces is its discretionary capacity. In Puebla, co-
investment programmes and their requirements favour political manipulation and the state government sup-
port municipalities for political reasons. Under these conditions, multi-level governance supports political
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clientelism, and political inference takes part of the implementation process. Consequently, mechanisms that
diminish political factors, should be strengthened, as well as increasing monitoring from the federal level to
the state government. International organisations suggest eﬃciency gains in the government through downsiz-
ing bureaucracy. However, in the studied cases, it is necessary to increase the number of employees to monitor
and enforce policy implementation.
Organisations such as the OECD recommend that the Mexican government increases its eﬀorts towards
decentralisation (OECD, 2013). However, until now, the Mexican government has not seen important improve-
ments since the mid-80’s (CONAGUA, 2015c). Besides these results, the Mexican government continues with
this agenda. In 2015, CONAGUA asked for a credit of $200 million dollars from the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank to partially ﬁnance a programme called Integral Development of the Water Utilities (PRODI) (BID
& CONAGUA, 2016). The objective of this programme was to improve the operative and ﬁnancial sustainabil-
ity of the water utilities, at the municipal level (BID & CONAGUA, 2016).
It is under these circumstances that the systematic comparison of the GAT proves its value and the relevance
of a contextual analysis. While one can agree with the diagnosis of the OECD, there are disagreements about the
proposals. It seems that the goal is the implementation of IWRM. This research, as well as other previous
studies, supports the thesis that the role of the state government in a federal system is no longer a ‘weak
link’ (Lester & Goggin, 1998) or a vehicle to transfer responsibilities. Due to the fragmentation in the water
policy, there is a need for better coordination of water resources (Suhardimana, Clementb, & Bharatib,
2015), and complex institutional systems are fragmented due to a lack of overall coordination (Lubell,
2015). There are two ways to decrease this fragmentation. One is through ‘interactive forms of governance’,
meaning the involvement of stakeholders in the decision making process (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk,
2016) and the other can be a regionalisation policy, which can address the main sources of incoherence in
the governance structure (Vinke-de Kruijf, Dinica, & Augustijn, 2009). According to the results of this research,
it seems that in this top-down implementation context, the state level can help to decrease the fragmentation
and increase the coherence of the policy implementation.
Mexico is still facing important challenges regarding wastewater treatment. However, some guidelines can be
found in this research and the successful national cases, as the context plays a relevant role that is not necessarily
aligned with international agendas. Future research is needed to increase our understanding in the role of the
state level. Our operationalisation of the GAT is a step towards future WWTP governance assessments in
Mexico.
Note
1. They are called semi-normative, since their ethical value rests on the appreciation of the goals themselves.
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